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CHAPTER Ⅰ: INTRODUCTION 1

1. The Point of Departure 1

1.1. The Routine Cases and the Hard Cases 1

1.2. The Dilemma of the Decision-Maker 3

1.3. On the Responsibility to Justify the Decisions 5

1.4. Legalism Contra Anti-Legalism 7

2. A Scientific Approach to the Contents of Legal Norms 8

2.1. The Scholar and the Judge 8

2.2. Legal Dogmatics and Social Sciences 10

2.3. Legal Dogmatics and Legal Practice 13

2.3.1. Normal Legal Practice 14

2.3.2. Judicial Practice 15

3. The Concept of Legal Dogmatics - A More Precise Formulation 17

4. The Angle of Approach and the Basic Problems 19

CHAPTER Ⅱ: THE ONTOLOGY OF LAW 26

1. General Remarks 26

2. The Ontology of Interpretation in Legal Dogmatics 28

3. The Validity of a Legal Norm 33

3.1. Wroblewski's Three Approaches 33

3.2. Systematic Validity 33

3.3. The Efficacy of Legal Norms 38

3.4. The Acceptability of a Legal Norm 43

CHAPTER Ⅲ: THE METHODOLOGY OF INTERPRETATION IN LEGAL DOGMATICS 47

1. Basic Concepts 47

1.1. Two Research Strategies 47

1.2. A Norm Statement and an Interpretative Statement 49

1.2.1. The Concept of the Norm Statement 49

1.2.2. Conclusion 55

1.2.3. A Meaning Statement and an Interpretation Statement 56

1.2.4. A Norm Standpoint and an Interpretation Standpoint 59

1.2.5. Summary 60

1.3. The Concept of the Norm 61

2. A General Characterization of Interpretation and Interpretation Theory 67

2.1. Interpretation as a Hermeneutic Process 67

2.2. The Special Nature of Interpretation in Legal Dogmatics 72

3. The Sources of Law and the Directives of Legal Interpretation 77

3.1. On the Concept of the Sources of Law 77

3.1.1. The Source of Information 77

3.1.2. The Source of Reasoning 77

3.2. The List of the Sources of Law 78

3.2.1. The Finnish Catalogue of the Sources 78

3.2.2. General Remarks 88

3.3. The Categorization of the Sources of Law 89

3.3.1. The Bindingness of the Sources of Law 89

3.3.2. Authoritative Reasons and Substantial Reasons 92

3.4. Directives of Legal Interpretation 95

3.4.1. The Order of Preference of the Sources of Law 97

3.4.2. The Standards of the Reasoning Procedure 101

4. Justification of the Interpretative Standpoint: Structural Analysis 107

4.1. The Point of Departure: Disagreement on the Result of the Interpretation 107

4.2. The Scope for Interpretation: Gaps and Conflicts in the Legal Order 110

4.3. The Procedure of Discourse 115

4.4. Internal and External Justification 119

4.5. The Structure of the Ex-Justification Procedure 120

4.6. An Example of the Justification Procedure 122

4.6.1. Travaux Priparatoires 123

4.6.2. Systemic Interpretation 126

4.6.3. Court Decisions as Reasons 128

4.6.4. On the Doctrinal Opinion 129

4.6.5. Practical Reasons 131

4.6.6. Summary 134

4.7. The Relation Between the Systematization and the Interpretation of Legal Norms 136

4.7.1. The Concept of Systematization 136

4.7.2. An Example of Systematization: An Analysis of the Position of the Heir 149

CHAPTER Ⅳ: THE ACCEPTABILITY OF AN INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT 158

1. The Principle of the One Right Answer 158

1.1. A Terminological Clarification 158

1.2. Examples of the Doctrines of the One Right Answer 161

1.2.1. Ronald Dworkin's Theory 161

1.2.2. Norm Statements as Norm Propositions 166

1.2.2.1. Norm Statements as Predictions 166

1.2.2.1.1. The Specific Nature of Legal Predictions 166

1.2.2.1.2. On the Alf Ross' Predictive Theory 170

1.2.2.2. Ilkka Niiniluoto's Approach 174

1.2.2.3. Norm Propositions as Technical Norms 180

1.2.2.3.1 General Remarks 180

1.2.2.3.2 Secondary Technical Norms 181

1.2.2.3.3 Primary Technical Norms 182

2. Acceptability and Rationality 185

2.1 The General Preconditions of the Justification of an Interpretative Standpoint 185

2.2 The Concept of Rational Acceptability 188

2.3 Why Be Rational? 193

2.4 The General Conditions of Rational Discourse 195

2.4.1 The Point of Departure 195

2.4.2 The Basic Principles and Rules of D-Rationality 196

2.4.2.1. Consistency-Rules 196

2.4.2.2. Efficiency-Rules 196

2.4.2.3. Sincerity-Rules 197

2.4.2.4. Generalization-Rules 198

2.4.2.5. Support-Rules 198

2.4.3. The Rules of the Burden of Proof 201

2.4.3.1. Procedural Rules of the Burden of Proof 202

2.4.3.2. Material Rules of the Burden of Proof 203

2.4.4 Summary 203

2.5. Interpretations and Evaluations 204

2.6. Knowledge, Certainty and Form of Life 213

2.7. The Audience and the Form of Life 221

2.7.1. Perelman's Theory of the Audience 221

2.7.2. Some Clarifications 222

2.7.2.1. The Concrete Audience 222

2.7.2.2. The Ideal Audience 224

2.7.3. Rational Acceptability as a Regulative Principle for Legal Dogmatics 225

EPILOGUE 230

NOTES 237

ABBREVIATIONS 260

BIBLIOGRAPHY 261

INDEX 272

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