REASON AND AUTHHORITYPDF电子书下载

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Prologue 1

PART Ⅰ: INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 7

1 Reason and Authority 7

2 What is Law? 19

2.1. Law and Society 19

2.2. Rigidity or Elasticity? 20

2.3. Form vs. Substance of Law 25

2.3.1. "Form" vs. "Substance" 26

2.3.2. The Structure of Legal Phenomena 27

2.3.3. Additional Features of Form 28

2.3.4. Advantages of Form 29

2.3.5. The Balancing of Advantages and Disadvantages 31

2.3.6. The New Coming of Form? 33

2.3.6.1. Opening 33

2.3.6.2. Form in a Broad Sense (Sensu Largo) 33

2.3.6.3. Form in a Narrow Sense (Sensu Stricto) 34

2.3.6.4. A Final Remark 36

3 Is Law in Crisis? 39

3.1. State and Society 39

3.2. On the Incrementalism 41

3.3. The System and Lebenswelt 43

3.4. The Crisis Tendencies 45

4 The Dilemmas of the Interpreter 49

5 Levels of Understanding 51

5.1. A Parable 51

5.2. On the Closed Systems 52

5.3. Porosity of the System 53

5.4. The Pyramid of Understanding 54

5.5. An Example 56

PART Ⅱ: THE PARADIGM OF LEGAL SCIENCE 61

1 Theories on Legal Science 61

1.1. In General 61

1.2. Alf Ross's Theory of Legal Science 62

1.2.1. The Philosophical Background Assumption 63

1.2.2. The Legal Philosophical Thesis 64

1.2.3. The Functions of the Legal Norm 65

1.2.4. Legal Dogmatics as a Legal Science 67

2 Legal Dogmatics as a Paradigm-Based Field of Inquiry 75

2.1. The Family of Legal Sciences 75

2.1.1. Legal Dogmatics 75

2.1.2. Sociology of Law 75

2.1.3. Historical Study of Law 76

2.1.4. Comparative Study of Law 77

2.1.5. Summary 77

2.2. The Paradigm of Legal Dogmatics: Preliminary Remarks 78

2.3. Paradigms as Interpretations of the Matrix 84

PART Ⅲ: LEGAL DOGMATICS AS AN INTERPRETATIVE ACTIVITY 91

1 Law and Language 91

1.1. Semantic Ambiguity in Literature 91

1.2. Comparison to the Legal Interpretation 93

2 On the Philosophical Background of the Treatise 99

2.1. Legal Hermeneutics 99

2.1.1. Introductory Remarks 99

2.1.2. What Is Hermeneutics About? A Specification of the Viewpoint 101

2.2. A Glance at Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy 106

2.2.1. The Dimensions of Language 106

2.2.2. Language, Thought and Reality 107

2.2.3. On the Concept of Language-Game 109

2.2.4. The Impossibility of Private Language 114

2.2.5. The Relationship Between Language and Reality 117

2.2.6. On Certainty 119

2.2.7. A Conclusion 123

2.3. An Ontological Point of View 127

2.3.1. Introduction 127

2.3.2. An Example. Legal Fictions 128

2.3.3. A Reductionist Point of View 130

2.3.4. Conventional Facts 134

3 On the Interpretation in Legal Dogmatics 143

3.1. Meaning Proposition, Interpretation Proposition and Interpretation Standpoint 143

3.1.1. Basic Definitions 143

3.1.1.1. Expression and Meaning 143

3.1.1.2. Meaning Proposition 143

3.1.1.3. Interpretation Proposition 144

3.1.1.4. Norm Formulation vs. Norm 144

3.1.1.5. Theoretical vs. Practical Propositions 145

3.1.2. On Theoretical Propositions 146

3.1.2.1. Norm Propositions 146

3.1.2.2. Technical Norms 146

Primary Technical Norms 147

Secondary Technical Norms 148

3.1.2.3. Stipulative Definitions 149

3.1.2.4. Analytic Definitions 149

3.1.3. Practical Propositions 150

3.1.3.1. Norm Standpoints 150

3.1.3.2. Norm Recommendations 152

3.1.4. A Comparison: Norm Standpoint vs. Interpretative Standpoint 153

3.1.5. Summary 154

3.2. The Concept of Norm 155

3.3. Types of Legal Norms 160

3.3.1. Regulative vs. Constitutive Norms 160

3.3.2. Competence Norms 163

3.3.3. Procedural Norms 164

3.3.4. Legal Definitions 165

3.3.5. Summary 165

3.4. Types of Norms in Modern Law 165

3.5. On the Validity of Legal Norms 167

3.5.1. Existence vs. Validity 167

3.5.2. The Variety of Validity Notions 167

3.5.3. Systemic Validity 168

3.5.4. Factual Validity 169

3.5.5. Axiological Validity 172

3.6. Rules vs. Principles 174

3.6.1. The Strong vs. Weak Demarcation Thesis 174

3.6.2. The Linguistic Point of View 176

3.6.2.1. Defeasibility 176

3.6.2.2. The Categories of Principles 177

3.6.2.3. The Scale of Rules and Principles 179

3.6.3. Reasoning with Rules and Principles 180

3.6.3.1. Principles as "Ought to Be" Norms 180

3.6.3.2. Principles as Optimization Mandates 181

3.6.4. The Validity Problem 184

4 Justification of Legal Interpretations 187

4.1. Conceptual Clarifications 187

4.2. Why to Justify? 188

4.2.1. The Scholar vs. the Judge 188

4.2.2. Expectation of Legal Certainty 189

4.2.3. On the Reasons 193

4.3. Two Types of Justification 196

4.3.1. Internal Justification 196

4.3.1.1. The Interpretative Point of View 196

4.3.1.2. The Structure of the Internal Justification 197

4.3.2. The External Justification 198

4.3.3. On the Coherence 200

4.3.4. External Justification as a Dialogue 201

4.4. The "Best Possible" Justification 205

4.5. The Concept of Rational Acceptability 207

4.6. The Nature and Basis of Rational Discourse 209

4.7. The Fundament of Practical Discourse 214

5 On the Concept of One Right Answer 217

5.1. Final vs. Right Answer 217

5.2. The Strong Version 217

5.3. The Weak Version 217

5.4. A Critical Attitude 218

5.5. Towards a Conventionalist Theory of Ethical Relativism 220

5.6. The Majority Principle 227

5.7. To Conclude 229

5.8. The Regulative Principle of Legal Reasoning 231

5.9. Several Right Answers? 232

PART Ⅳ: THE CHANGE AND PROGRESS IN LEGAL DOGMATICS 237

1 Systems in Legal Dogmatics 237

1.1. The Concept of Systematization 237

1.2. A Critical View 240

1.2.1. On the Basic System 240

1.2.2. The Formulation of the System 242

1.2.3. The Reformulation of the System 243

1.3. Summary 244

2 The Paradigmatic Change in Legal Dogmatics 247

2.1. On the Change and Progress in General 247

2.2. Elements of the Theories in Legal Dogmatics 253

2.3. Examples of the Change and Progress in Legal Dogmatics 255

2.3.1. An Introductory Point of View 255

2.3.2. Case Studies 256

2.3.2.1. Authorization 256

2.3.2.2. Bills of Exchange 259

2.3.2.3. Legal Position of the Heir 265

2.3.2.4. The Right of Ownership 268

EPILOGUE: LEGAL SCIENCE AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE 277

1 The Question 277

2 What Does a Philosopher Say about the Matter? 279

3 A Brief Recapitulation 281

3.1. On the Impossibility of Private Language 281

3.2. Law as Relations Between People 282

3.3. The Becoming Legalized of Social Relationships 283

4 Legal Science vs. Social Science 285

4.1. General Characterization 285

4.2. The Circle Closes 286

Bibliography 289

Index 303

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