LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL THIRD EDITIONPDF电子书下载

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Chapter One.Introduction 1

Chapter Two.Economic Tools and Concepts 7

A.Demand,Supply and Market Equilibrium 7

1. Demand 7

2. Supply 11

3. Market Equilibrium 14

B.Elasticity 16

1. Generally 16

2. Incidence Analysis 18

C.Perfect and Imperfect Markets 22

D.Marginal Analysis Generally 27

E.Efficiency 28

1. Allocative Efficiency 29

2. The Theory of Second Best 31

3. Pareto Optimality and Superiority 33

4. Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency 37

F.Externalities 39

1. Negative Externalities and Property Rights 39

a.Negative Externalities 39

b.The Tragedy of the Commons 40

c.The Prisoner’s Dilemma 40

2. Positive Externalities,Free-Riding and Public Goods 43

a.Positive Externalities 43

b.Free-Riding 43

c.Public Goods 44

G.Takings,Efficiency and Externalities 46

Chapter Three.Some Complications in the Application of Economics to Law 49

A.Rational Maximizer of Self-Interest 50

1. Wealth and Endowment Effects 51

2. Ultimatum Games 53

B.Choices and Preferences 56

1. Public Goods and Free Riding 57

2. The Prisoner’s Dilemma 57

3. The Possibility of Counter…Preferential Choice 58

4. False Consciousness 59

5. Framing Problems 60

C.Preferences,Values,and Lexical Ordering 61

Chapter Four.The Coase Theorem and Related Property Issues 66

A.The Coase Theorem 66

1. Allocative Implications 66

2. Assignment of Rights and Distributive Effects 70

3. Transaction Costs 72

B.Bargaining Problems 74

C.The Wealth Effect 77

D.Reactions to Transaction Costs 81

1. Duplicating Friction-Free Transactions 81

2. Asymmetrical Transaction Costs 86

E.Protecting Entitlements 87

Chapter Five.Contract Law Applica-tions 93

A.Contract Law: Theory and Economic Goals 93

1. Exchange, The Contract Curve, and Pareto Efficiency 93

2. Why Does Contract Law Exist? 100

3. Contract Formation and Private Risk Allocation 102

4. The Economic Goals of Contract Law 103

B.Contract Formation 104

1. Capacity 105

2. Duress 108

3. Offer and Acceptance and Other For-malities 110

4. The Consideration Requirement 112

a.Adequacy of Consideration 113

b.Nominal Consideration 114

c.Gratuituous Promise 115

d.Contract Modification 120

C.Contract Law and Distributive Goals 121

1. Exculpatory Provisions 123

2. Unconscionability 129

D.Contract Remedies 136

1. The Efficient Breach 136

2. Specific Performance 141

3. Liquidated Damages 144

4. The Lost Volume Seller 146

E.Breach and Excuses for Non-Performance 149

1. Breach 149

2. Excuses for Non-Performance 152

Chapter Six. Economics of Tort Law 156

A.The Costs of Accidents and the Economics of Tort Law 157

B.Liability, The Assignment of Rights and Externalities 159

C.The Negligence Standard 163

1. The Hand Formula 163

2. Distributive Consequences 164

D.Refining the Negligence Model: Contribu-tory Negligence 165

1. The Conventional Doctrine 165

2. Reconciling Contributory Negligence and Efficiency 166

E.Refining the Negligence Standard: Com-parative Negligence 169

1. Apportioned Comparative Negligence 170

2. Unapportioned Comparative Negli-gence 173

F.Assumption of the Risk 174

G.Strict Liability 175

1. Efficiency and Strict Liability 176

2. Risk-Aversion and Loss Spreading 180

3. Duty to Rescue 187

4. Defenses to Strict Liability 188

a.Unforeseeable Misuse 189

b.Unreasonable Assumption of Risk 190

c.Contributory and Comparative Neg-ligence 190

H.Damages 191

1. The Collateral Source Rule 192

2. Future Losses 193

3. Hedonic Losses 197

4. Punitive Damages 198

Chapter Seven. Economic Analysis of Criminal Law 200

A.Why Have Criminal Law? 201

1. Creating an Incentive for Market Ex-changes 202

2. Criminal Law and Externalities 207

a.Externalities Generally 208

b.Externalities and “Victimless Crimes” 211

3. Criminal Law and Behavior 215

B.Administering Criminal Sanctions 219

1. The Optimal Level of Criminal Conduct 220

2. Deterrence Options 225

C.Criminal Procedure 230

Chapter Eight.The Economics of Anti-trust 234

A.The Competitive Extremes of Perfect Com-petition and Monopoly 235

1. Demand and Supply 235

2. Market Equilibrium, Producer and Consumer Surplus 240

3. The Individual Firm Under Perfect Competition: The Marginal Cost =Marginal Revenue Rule 243

4. Cost Curves 246

5. Equilibrium and Perfect Competition 250

6. Monopoly 253

7. Perfect Competition and Monopoly Compared 255

8. Some Limits on the Comparison 258

B.Market Power and Market Definition 261

1. Market Power 261

2. The Lerner Index 262

3. The Determinants of Market Power 263

4. Market Definition and Cross-Elasticity 264

5. Geographic Markets 266

6. Supply Elasticity 267

7. A Classic and a Contemporary Example 269

a.United States v.Aluminum Compa-ny of America （Alcoa） 269

b.United States v.Microsoft 271

Chapter Nine. The Economics of Gov-ernment Regulation 273

A.The Natural Monopoly Rationale 274

1. The Theory of Natural Monopoly 274

2. Agency Regulation 278

a.Revenue Requirement 278

b.Rate Regulation 280

c.Cross-Subsidization 285

3. Contestable Markets 288

B.Excessive Competition 289

C.The Allocation of Inherently Scarce Re-sources 293

D.Reactions to Transaction Costs and Exter-nalities 296

1. Rationalizing an Industry 297

2. Increasing the Availability of Informa-tion 299

3. Reactions to Externalities 303

E.Social Justice Regulations 310

Chapter Ten.Intellectual Property 314

A.The Economic Rationale 315

B.Limiting Protection 319

C.Striking the Balance 321

1. The Doctrine of Equivalents 322

2. Fair Use 323

D.Duration 328

E.Remedies 331

Chapter Eleven.Public Choice 335

A.Why Have a Government? 336

B.Approaches to Government 341

1. Utilitarianism 341

2. Rawls’ Theory of Justice 344

C.Why Vote at All? 346

D.Problems of Ascertaining Preferences Through Voting 348

1. Unanimity and Majority Voting 348

2. Arrow’s Theorem and Possible Solu-tions 352

a.Logrolling 356

b.Single-Peaked Preferences 358

E.The Economic Theory of Legislation 359

1. What Do Legislators Want? 359

2. Interest Groups 362

3. The Market for Legislation 364

INDEX 369

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