THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYPDF电子书下载

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1.A Framework for Analysis of the Antitrust-Intellectual PropertyIntersection 1

1.1 Introduction 1

1.2 The Factual Scope of the Interface 2

1.3 The Historical Context of the Antitrust-IP Cusp 4

1.4 Theoretical Aspects of the Interface 6

1.4.1 Policy Goals of the Two Institutions 6

1.4.2 The Methodologies of the Two Institutions 16

1.4.3 Some Thoughts about Colliding Goals and Methods 25

1.5 Conclusion 26

2.The Austrian Economics Solution and the Property Narrative 38

2.1 Introduction 38

2.2 The Austrian Economics View of Competition 38

2.2.1 Austrian Economics: a Pragmatic Doctrine 39

2.2.2 The Inherent Dynamic Nature of ‘Austrian’ Competition 40

2.2.3 The Role of Entrepreneurship in Austrian Competition 44

2.2.4 On the Fallacies of the Neoclassical Competition Model 45

2.3 Notions Narrowing the IP-Antitrust Conflict 48

2.3.1 Austrian Economics Drawing Competition and Innovation Together 48

2.3.2 The Faults of the IP Mechanism 49

2.4 The Property Narrative of the Antitrust-IP Conflict 52

2.4.1 The Property Account of Antitrust 52

2.4.2 The Property Account of Intellectual Property 60

2.4.3 Implications of the Property Narrative 64

2.4.4 Some Thoughts Arising From the Property Narratives Conflict 67

3.The Dynamic Antitrust Analysis Model 80

3.1 Introduction 80

3.2 The Untold Austrian Assumptions 81

3.2.1 Dynamic （Time） Notions 84

3.2.2 Uncertainty （Ignorance） Notions 87

3.2.3 Prerequisite Circumstantial Assumptions Distinguished from End Results of the Competitive Process 89

3.3 The Dynamic Analysis 90

3.3.1 Different Monopoly Concepts 90

3.3.2 Dynamic Antitrust Analysis 92

3.4 Placing the Property Narratives within the Dynamic Antitrust Paradigm 103

3.4.1 Intellectual Property Rights 104

3.4.2 The Antitrust Rights 104

3.5 Conclusion 108

4.Application of the Dynamic Model on Refusal to License Intellectual Property （Magill） 118

4.1 Introduction 119

4.2 Preliminary Notions 123

4.2.1 Refusal to Deal versus Refusal to License 123

4.2.2 The Distinction between Existence of an IPR and Its Exercise 124

4.3 Refusal To License: the Magill Case 126

4.3.1 Magill Case: Findings of Fact 127

4.3.2 Magill Case: Findings of Law 129

4.3.3 Magill Case: Dynamic Analysis 133

4.3.4 Fitting the Dynamic Analysis into the Framework of EC Law 146

4.3.5 Economic Dependence versus Insulation from Competition 147

4.3.6 Advantages of Dynamic Analysis in Refusal to License Contexts 149

4.4 Conclusion 153

5.Application of the Dynamic Model in Network Industries （the Dell Case） 166

5.1 Introduction 166

5.2 Introducing Network Industries， their Competitive Patterns and Standards 166

5.3 Existing Antitrust Jurisprudence on Network Industries 169

5.3.1 Applicability of Antitrust Policy 170

5.3.2 Static Market Power 171

5.3.3 Lock-in Arguments 171

5.3.4 Summary 173

5.4 Dynamic Evaluation of the Effects of Standards on the Competitive Process 173

5.4.1 Arguments on Pro-competitive Aspects of Standards 174

5.4.2 Arguments on Anticompetitive Effects of Standards 179

5.4.3 Summary 182

5.5 From Theory to Practice: the Dell Case 183

5.5.1 The Dell Case Facts 183

5.5.2 Dell: Legal Setting of the Complaint 185

5.6 The Dell Case: a Dynamic Analysis 189

5.6.1 A Review of the FTC Dell Decision 189

5.6.2 Dynamic Analysis of the Dell Fact Pattern 191

5.7 Conclusion 199

Postscript 208

Bibliography 210

Index 239

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